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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper locates armed ethnic conflicts in Northeast India across four interactive 
qualitative variables: ethnic exclusivity and colonial isolation; strategy of the 
armed groups; the use of violence; and external connections. The Indian state’s 
response to these armed ethnic conflicts is located within three conceptual 
parametres: proportionate use of force; dialogue and negotiations; and structural 
changes in the affected areas. Cases of armed ethnic conflicts utilized for empirical 
illustration includes the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) and the United Liberation 
Front of Asom (ULFA) in Assam, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by 
Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu-NSCN (IM) based in Manipur and 
Nagaland, and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) based in Manipur. A 
few policy recommendations are also offered to better address armed ethnic 
conflicts in India’s Northeastern landscape.  
The two main research questions the paper addresses are the following: 
1. Why does Northeast India suffer from multiple armed ethnic conflicts since 
1947? 
2. What has been the Indian state‘s response to the multiple armed conflicts in the 
Northeast? 
 
 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
Northeast India is a rugged territory of 225,000 km of hills and plains located 
between four neighbouring countries of India, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China 
and Myanmar (See Figure I).  With an international border stretching up to 4, 500 
kms, the region has been affected by armed ethnic conflicts since Indian 
independence in 1947. Oldest amongst the ethnic conflicts is the Naga conflict 
starting as far back as 1918 with the formation of the Naga Club. In 1946, the Naga 
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National Council (NNC) was formed and it declared Naga independence on August 
14, 1947, a day before India declared its own independence. The Naga movement 
turned violent since the 1950s and is active till date under the leadership of the 
NSCN (IM). Manipur has also been grossly disturbed by armed violence with the 
formation of the UNLF on November 24, 1964. Another significant Manipuri 
separatist armed group known as the Revolutionary People‘s Front (RPF) and its 
armed wing, the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) has been engaging in armed 
struggle for a sovereign Meitei state since 1976. Assam has also been affected by 
ethnic violence since 1979 with the formation of the ULFA and later on the DHD in 
the 1990s. Most of these armed groups have been able to sustain themselves over a 
long period of time due to external support. Countries like China in the 1960s and 
the 1970s and later on Bangladesh and Myanmar have supported either directly or 
indirectly most of these armed groups by making available arms, training and base 
areas for underground camps (Bhaumik 1996: 1-16).The UNLF, the ULFA and the 
NSCN (IM) procure small arms through the Cox Bazar area in Bangladesh and had 
underground camps in the Chittagong and Mymensingh areas. Things have changed 
with Bangladesh in recent years with regard to closure of these camps after Sheikh 
Hasina came to power in 2008. 
 
Figure I: Map of Northeast India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2011 
 
  The stated political objective of the UNLF, the ULFA and the NSCN (IM) is a 
sovereign ethnic homeland for each. Only the DHD demand a separate state for the 
Dimasa population within India.This paper argues that in order to understand the 
nature of armed conflicts in Northeast India, the study must be methodologically 
placed within the three levels of analyses conceptualized by J. David Singer (Singer 
1961: 77-92).While understanding local context (unit level) is critical to ascertain the 
root causes of the armed conflicts, it is equally important to analyze the external 
linkages (regional level) of the armed groups instrumental in providing the hardware 
of violence (small arms and illegal money). The role of the affected society in 
conflict resolution transcending the three levels is also significant revealing the role 
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of indigenous mediators in resolving traditional armed ethnic conflicts. Edwar Azar 
offers an interesting model of conflict called the ―theory of protracted social conflict 
(PSC)‖ (Azar 1990: 23-27) where he argues that internal conflicts cannot be 
understood by creating an artificial functional differentiation between the social, 
psychological, economic or ethnic elements or between its internal and external 
dimensions. Azar believes that the root causes and nature of violence involved in 
internal conflicts were determined by ―across level variables‖ rather than 
compartmentalized ones. To him, the most useful unit of analysis in internal 
conflicts is the unit level: racial, religious, ethnic and cultural. He also points out the 
significance of the ‗individual‘ (at the unit level of analysis), as a main factor for 
understanding rebel membership. To him, most of the individual loyalties and 
motivations to join armed groups are an attempt to fulfill one‘s own basic needs: 
security, identity, recognition, economic fulfillment, etc. I affirm this line of 
argument and add that while the ‗individual‘ is an important factor to understand 
rebel membership, structural conditions like poverty, lack of employment, relative 
deprivation (Gurr 1969: 15-40) and the availability of small arms and an illegal war 
economy (Kaldor 2007: 1-17) play an equally important role in sustaining armed 
ethnic conflicts. 
 
 
EXTRAPOLATING THE FACTORS 
 
The four interactive qualitative variables leading to armed ethnic conflicts in the 
Northeast isolated for study are: ethnic exclusivity and colonial isolation; strategy of 
the armed groups; the use of violence; and external connections. 
 
Ethnic Exclusivity and Colonial Isolation  
 
The basic issues leading to armed ethnic conflicts in the Northeast are identity, 
ethnicity, desire for political empowerment and land. Added to this is the colonial 
residue of being treated as ―excluded, partially excluded‖ areas based on the Inner 
Line Regulation of 1873.
3
 Due to the lack of a pre-colonial and colonial integrative 
policy with the rest of India, the hill tribes resisted the post-colonial Indian state‘s 
entry into the hill interiors. And out of these contradictions emanates what Johan 
Galtung conceptualized in the 1960s: the conflict triangle. According to Galtung, 
conflict, both symmetric and asymmetric, is best understood when seen through a 
triangle, whose vertices consists of i) contradiction, ii) attitude and iii) behaviour 
(Galtung 1996: 17-19). Contradiction refers to the actual or perceived 
incompatibilities of goals between conflicting actors and the conflict of interest 
inherent in the relationship between them; attitude refers to negative perceptions of 
the ―other‖, which is mostly informed by emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and 
conative (will) components. Behaviour includes threats, coercion, and direct physical 
attacks. According to Galtung, all three factors act simultaneously resulting in the 
dynamic nature of violence (Galtung 1996: 17-21). Interesting, these factors are 
evident in the ethnic movements pertaining to the NSCN (IM), UNLF, ULFA and 
the DHD.  
 
The Naga ethnic conflict has a long historical trajectory tracing back its roots to 
1918 with the formation of the Naga Club by 20 members of the Naga French 
Labour Corp, who had served in World War I in Europe. The few Nagas who had 
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 The Inner Line Regulation of 1873 prohibited any British Indian subjects from entering 
Naga inhabited areas without having a prior permission thereof. The same policy continues 
till date even after India became independent in 1947.  
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come in contact with the European battlefield were motivated to politically organize 
themselves as a distinct ethnic political identity. The local British administration in 
Naga areas did not dissuade this move. The Club submitted a memorandum to the 
Simon Commission in 1929, in which it stated that the people of Naga areas and that 
of mainland India had nothing in common between them. ―We should not be thrust 
to the mercy of the people who could never subjugate us, but leave us alone to 
determine ourselves as in ancient times‖ (Nuh and Lasuh, 2002: 114). This view was 
supported by John Henry Hutton, the Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills, and N C 
Parry, Superintendent of Lushai Hills, in 1928 and 1930, respectively. Hutton, 
presenting the case of the Nagas to the Simon Commission asserted that the tribes of 
Northeast India were racially, linguistically, culturally, politically, and economically 
distinct from the Indians. He believed they would suffer by joining a people of 
irreconcilable culture in an unnatural union that would harm them and the people of 
the plains too.
4
 Hutton and Parry even envisioned a separate ‗Crown Colony‘ or a 
North East Frontier for the Naga territories (Chaube 1973: 69 and Gundeiva 1975: 
67). 
 
In 1946, the Naga Club was further reinforced with the formation of the NNC 
under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo, a charismatic leader belonging to the Angami 
tribe. Significantly, a Nine Point Agreement known as the Akbar Hydari Agreement 
was signed between the moderates in the NNC like T. Sakhrie and Imkonglba Ao 
and the Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari on June 29, 1947. The Agreement 
gave the Nagas rights over their land as well as executive and legislative powers but 
the Agreement was rejected by Phizo. On August 14, 1947, Phizo declared Naga 
independence, a day before India attained its own independence. The period between 
mid-1950s to early 1990s were a tumultuous period in Naga history with militancy 
on the rise coupled by the state‘s military response propelled by acts like the Armed 
Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, amended in 1972. The cross-fire between the 
state forces and the NNC resulted in many non-combatant deaths as well as human 
rights violations. Though efforts at peace continued with the grant of statehood to 
Naga areas in 1963, the establishment of a peace mission in 1964 and the signing of 
the Shillong Peace Accord in 1975, the demand for a sovereign Naga ethnic 
homeland was not given up. The Shillong Accord was the proximate cause for the 
foundation of the unified National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). 
Replicating Phizo‘s aversion to the Hydari Agreement, Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak 
Chisi Swu and and S S  Khaplang, then young leaders of the NNC, condemned the 
Shillong Accord as a sell out to the Union government by the NNC moderates and 
formed the NSCN in Myanmar in 1980. Subsequently, due to intense differences 
between Khaplang, Muivah and Swu, the NSCN further split into two factions: the 
NSCN (IM) led by Muivah and Swu while Khaplang formed the National Socialist 
Council of Nagaland---NSCN (K) in 1988. Incidentally, both the NSCN (IM) and 
the NSCN (K) are under cease-fires with the Union government since 1997 and 2001 
respectively. Significantly, despite increasing factionalism, the notion of ethnic 
exclusiveness and unique history are recurring demands from all the Naga armed 
groups. In the latest round of talks with the Union government in January 2011, 
Muivah, the General Secretary of the NSCN (IM) stated that for a final resolution to 
the Naga ethnic conflict, the Union government must give due recognition to the 
unique history and culture of the Nagas in an institutionalized manner.
5
 
                                                        
4
 See Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills District, Hutton to the Indian Statutory Commission 
Memorandum of the Government of Assam, Indian Statutory Commission, 14, London, 1930, 
pp. 111-118.  
5Nishit Dholabhai, ―Leaders Tryst with Destiny—Swu Drops Hint that Khaplang May Join 
Talks‖, The Telegraph, January 24, 2011 at 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110124/jsp/frontpage/story_13484375.jsp (sighted on 01.02.2011).  
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The radical turn in Assamese nationalism could be traced back to the influx of 
illegal migrants from East Pakistan after partition of India in 1947, and later 
Bangladesh since 1971 onwards. This massive migrant flow created immense 
anxieties amongst the ethnic Assamese population, who resented the rapidly 
changing demographic profile of the state and the loss of land to the Bengali 
migrant. The dominant Assamese fear is that the Bangladeshi illegal migrants will 
demographically dominate Assam politically, socially and economically.
6
 This issue 
of illegal migration from Bangladesh resulted in the non-violent highly visible 
Assam Agitation (1979-1984) spearheaded by the All Assam Student‘s Union 
(AASU). That agitation resulted in the Assam Accord of 1985 which stated that 
anybody settled in Assam from Bangladesh after March 25, 1971 is not a citizen, but 
an illegal migrant. This provision of the Accord, due to its non-compliance at the 
level of state policy, has however failed to change the nature of Bangladeshi 
immigration into Assam, now termed as a ―silent invasion‖. Though there is no 
documented data on the number of illegal migration, it is assumed that out of the 26 
million people residing in Assam according to the 2001 census, around 6 million are 
illegal Bangladeshi migrants.  
 
The most proximate cause of the Assam Agitation was however not the 
Bangladeshi illegal migrant issue by itself but the blatant politicization of it in local 
Assamese politics. Malpractices in the electoral procedure of 1979 in Assam came to 
light when in the Mangaldoi Assembly elections, 45,000 illegal migrants‘ names 
were found on the voter‘s list. The first strike against this was kick started on June 8, 
1979. The AASU led agitation demanded that the 1951 National Register for 
Citizens be utilized to determine the citizenship of all those living in Assam. 
Subsequently, the 1983 state elections witnessed tremendous voter malpractices with 
the state‘s heavy handed response to non-violent dissent leading to one of the most 
violent ethnic movements in Assam. The ULFA was formed on April 7, 1979 at 
Ranghar, in Sibsagar district, a place of historical significance since the time of the 
Ahom rule. Most of the recruits of the ULFA were drawn from the Asom Jatiyabadi 
Parishad (AJYCP), which professed Marxism and advocated the Assamese right to 
dual citizenship and self-determination. The outfit advocated scientific socialism, 
Assamese nationalism and self-determination or Swadhin Asom (Independent 
Assam). The ULFA sought to revert Assam‘s status to the Ahom ruled Assam, pre-
1826 treaty of Yandaboo between the British and the Burmese, which ushered in 
British rule in Assam (Baruah 1994: 863-897).ULFA‘s Vice Chairman, Pradip 
Gogoi states that his organization‘s political objectives are ―Sovereign, Socialist 
Assam‖ in which ―All indigenous people must stay, all others must leave‖.7 
 
The UNLF in Manipur was established by Arambam Samaranda Singh. It is 
based on a leftist ideology vis-à-vis the economic and social alienation of the people 
of Manipur which the group asserts will be undone with the establishment of an 
ethnic Meitei sovereign homeland. The outfit‘s support base is mostly from Meiteis 
inhabiting the Imphal valley. Indeed, the UNLF enjoys a reasonable degree of 
support in Meitei areas of Manipur as there is a deep seated fear of the NSCN (IM)‘s 
agenda of Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) [Goswami 2007: 287-313]. The Nagalim 
map includes all Naga inhabited areas in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal 
Pradesh. Manipur had erupted into violence in 2001 when the Union government 
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the Field‖, IDSA Issue Brief, January 11, 2010 at 
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7Seema Hussein, ―Exclusive Interview, PradipGogoi, Jailed ULFA Vice Chairman‖, The 
Week News Magazine, July 20, 2003 at http//www.the-week.com/23jul20/events/9.html. 
(sighted on 5 January 2007). 
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extended the cease-fire with the NSCN (IM) to Naga inhabited areas in Manipur. 
The resistance turned so violent that the Union government had to revoke the move. 
The situation, in fact, reflects the classic ―security dilemma‖ faced by states at the 
systemic level. When one state arms itself, neighbouring states feel insecure. 
Consequently, the best way to protect oneself is to increase ones own armament. 
This situation is reflected when two or more ethnic groups occupy the same space. 
When one ethnic group arms itself, other ethnic groups also arm themselves creating 
a vicious cycle of ―violence‖ versus ―counter-violence‖ (Hartzell 2006: 31-52). 
 
The DHD was formed in 1995 after most of the cadres of the erstwhile Dimasa 
National Security Force (DNSF) surrendered with the exception of its commander 
Jewel Garlosa.
8
 It was under his leadership that the DHD was organized into a 
violent force. The stated demand of the then unified DHD (it subsequently broke into 
two factions in 2003) was a unified Dimaraji state comprised of ethnic Dimasa 
inhabited areas of N C Hills district, Karbi Anglong district, Cachar district, parts of 
Nagaon district in Assam, and Dimapur and Dimasa inhabited areas in Dhansiripar 
in Nagaland. Interestingly, the demands of the NSCN (IM) for a unified Nagalim 
(Greater Nagaland), the DHD for a Dimasa state, the ULFA for a sovereign Asom 
and the UNLF for a Meitei homeland consist of conflicting claims to overlapping 
territorial spaces. Indeed, the emergence of multiple ethnic armed groups with claims 
over the same territory has further complicated the situation in these remote areas of 
Assam (See Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2: Insurgencies in Northeast India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author; map devised by the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2011 
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 Interview with Pranob Nunisa, Self Styled Commander in Chief and President of DHD, 
Haflong, July 19, 2007. 
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Strategy of the Armed Groups 
 
Strategy, traditionally, has come to be understood as ―the use that is made of force 
and the threat of force for the ends of policy‖ (Gray 1999: 17). Significantly, with 
regard to insurgencies, strategy entails more than just the mere use of force. It 
involves the ―total house of strategy‖ (Lawrence 1935: 1-10) including not only the 
use of force/violence as an assertion of political intent, but also economic, political, 
psychological, cultural and social factors (Shy and Collier 1986: 815-862).The 
nature and character of an armed group‘s use of force cannot be simplistically 
understood as resulting in direct bodily harm, mostly the consequence of 
conventional use of force. Notably, with regard to the use of force by states, 
legitimacy is automatic due to the fact that states enjoy monopoly of organized 
violence. On the other hand, the use of violence as a means to an end by rebel groups 
requires deliberate efforts at legitimization. Therefore, armed groups‘ strategy 
involves a complex mix of political legitimization, support base, emotional category, 
symbolic gestures and historical narratives buttressed by the elements of time and 
space. In an interesting essay on asymmetric conflict, Andrew Mack argues that the 
―the aim of the insurgents is not the destruction of the military capability of their 
opponents as an end in itself…Direct costs become of strategic importance when, 
and only when, they are translated into indirect costs. These are psychological and 
political…‖ achieved through prolonged conflict (Mack 1983: 126-151). 
 
Politics forms the core of any armed group‘s mobilization strategy (Gray 1999: 
283-85). Armed groups garner popular support for their violent means by citing a 
political cause which is important to the target population. Mao Tse Tung, one of the 
best known theorists of revolutionary warfare indicated the importance of the 
political objective based on local support for the success of a revolutionary rebel 
movement (Griffith 1962: 42-43 and Fall 1998: 46-57) Violence justified by 
―politics‖ also diffuses the outrage felt by society against indiscriminate violence in 
normal circumstances (Kiras 2002  : 211). It must also be noted that armed groups 
construct a ―social imaginary‖ (Schmidt 2001: 4) based on real or perceived 
economic, political and social alienation, and cultural subjugation by ―other‖ 
dominant cultures thereby vindicating the need for violent assertion to bring to bear 
the legitimate concerns of the armed groups‘ social base (Schmidt 2001: 2-6). 
 
 It is also crucial to understand the role of ―power‖ in mobilizing recruits for 
armed revolt. Rebel leaders behave like socially powerful individuals; they display 
their prestige by openly projecting their armed cadres, weapons and financial 
prowess. In areas where the state is unable to provide livelihood, rebel employment 
is looked upon as an important source of livelihood for unemployed youths.   
 
The NSCN (IM), the ULFA, the UNLF and the DHD have a declared strategy 
of protracted armed conflict. Interestingly, cease-fires are seen as a phase when an 
outfit can re-group, recruit, finance and re-arm oneself. This has happened in most 
cases. The ULFA and the NSCN (IM) re-armed and re-grouped themselves during 
the cease-fire phases.
9
 During the 2007 ceasefire period, the ULFA reorganized its 
units in the traditional stronghold of Dibrugarh, Sivasagar, Tinsukia, and formed 
                                                        
9
 ―Assam Timeline 2007‖ at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/timelines/index.html (sighted on 5 
March 2007). (The PCG was the 11 member civilian group formed by ULFA in September 
2005 to talk to the Centre on its behalf). 
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new battalions like the 27
th
 battalion.
10
 Similarly, the NSCN (IM) also increased its 
cadre-base from 1000 in 1997 to 5000 in 2010.
11
 
 
The UNLF started its overt violent movement in 1990 with the formation of its 
armed wing, the Manipur Peoples‘ Army (MPA). Interestingly, the armed group‘s 
violence is not condemned outright by Meitei society as the reform agenda of the 
outfit appeals in a society reeling under the influence of AIDS, and drugs from 
Myanmar. Myanmar is part of the golden triangle transporting huge amounts of 
drugs and disease into India‘s North East. According to the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), poppy cultivation is on the rise in Myanmar with an estimated 
produce of 460 metric tons by 163, 000 households spread over 27, 700 hectares in 
2007 alone.
12
  Drug addiction/injected heroin users are increasing amongst the north 
eastern youths due to the easy availability of drugs through Moreh, Mokokchung and 
Champai, the three border towns in Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram respectively.
13
 
 
The strategy of the DHD is also informed by its protracted nature. As a result, it 
has not disarmed despite signing a cease-fire with the Union government. A recent 
video on a DHD (N) training camp situated deep in the jungles of Cachar district 
revealed that the outfit is training young boys and girls aged 12-18 to handle 
sophisticated weapons. Phaizan Dimasa, Assistant Commandant, DHD, Harangajao 
Camp admitted that there were nearly 500 hundred child/teenage insurgents in his 
outfit.
14
 
 
Use of Violence 
 
Despite cease-fires between the Union government and the armed groups, the cult of 
violence has dominated the social fabric in Northeast India. In fact, cease-fires 
appear to have benefitted the security forces rather than society at large. During the 
cease-fire period, while violence ceases between the armed groups and the security 
forces, violence between the multiple armed groups continues resulting in both 
combatant and non-combatant deaths. In this context, the ULFA increasingly 
attacked Hindi speaking people especially from the year 2005 onwards.  In January 
2006, it killed nearly 55 Hindi speaking people across Dibrugarh, Sivasagar, 
Tinsukia and Dhemaji districts in Assam.
15
 In August 2007, it changed its area of 
operation and struck in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam killing 14 Hindi 
speaking people. Significantly, it must be stated that ULFA‘s killings of Bihari 
migrants is influenced by its Bangladesh linkage; the Bihari migrants poses stiff 
competition to the illegal Bangladeshi migrants in Assam‘s cheap labour market. 
Therefore, Bangladesh‘s pressure groups could have in a quid pro quo demanded the 
ULFA to take violent action to deter more migration from neighbouring Bihar in 
order to benefit their own people migrating to Assam for livelihood.  
 
                                                        
10
 ―8 ULFA ultras arrested, Karbi Anglong Bandh Tomorrow‖, November 17, 2006 at 
http://www.zeenews.com/znnew/articles.asp?rep=2&aid=336232&sid=REG (sighted on 11.12.2006). 
11
 Field Visit by author to Nagaland, July-August 2007.  
12
 See UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) fact sheet, ‗Opium Poppy Cultivation in 
South East Asia 2007‘, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/icmp/fact_sheet_SEA_2007.pdf (sighted 
on 11 January 2007).  
13
 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‗Drug Use in the Northeastern States of India‘, 
http://www.unodc.org/india/drug_use_in_ne.html (sighted on 15 February 2008). 
14
 See Rajiv Bhattacharya, ―Assam‘s Teenage Guerrillas‖ at 
http://timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=5960# (sighted on 18 February 2008).  
15
 See ―Dealing with ULFA‘s Terror‖ at 
http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/InternalSecurityCluster220107.htm (sighted on 17.01.2006).   
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The NSCN (IM)‘s fratricidal killings against the NSCN (K) had vitiated the 
atmosphere in Naga areas in recent years. However, Naga society‘s enthusiastic 
participation in an informal yet structured dialogue based on their deep-seated desire 
for peace and progress in the Naga areas have strengthened the community-based 
peace movements and has succeeded to an extent in reasoning with the Naga armed 
actors to be responsible in their use of violence. From the late 1980s, the joint 
ownership of the process facilitated by the Naga Hoho has taken on a mass base, 
with participation increasing to an astounding 10, 000 people since 2007.
16
 In March, 
2009, a ‗Naga Convention for Reconciliation and Peace‘ was held in Kohima in 
order to send across ‗a message of peace and an end to bloodshed and violence‘.17 
The convention was attended by thousands of people from various Naga tribes, the 
militant actors, the church and the civil society. According to Vivi, General 
Secretary of the National Mothers‘ Association (NMA), ‗the convention is a positive 
attitude, everyone expressing the desire for reconciliation … and this is where we 
can build our hope‘.18 What is most refreshing to observe is that no single actor 
claims ownership of this process. Rather, it is viewed as a collective effort by all 
stakeholders to the conflict.  
 
However, I would like to add a caveat so that we keep the ‗politics of 
representation‘ in stark focus. Armed groups like the NSCN (IM) would ideally like 
to control the dialogue process. For instance, in 2001 the Naga Peace Reconciliation 
move under the joint ownership of the Naga Hoho, the Nagaland Peace Centre and 
the UNC proved so successful in addressing issues of violence, basic needs and 
political aspirations of the Nagas that the NSCN (IM) feared losing its dominant 
position as the sole peace negotiator with the Union Government. In reaction, it 
issued ‗threat notices‘ to the leaders of the Reconciliation Committee forcing them to 
leave Nagaland.
19
 
 
Learning a lesson or two about NSCN (IM) behaviour from these experiences, 
the later dialogues, especially from 2005 onwards, have involved both the NSCN 
(IM) and the NSCN (K) in the process of consultations. On July 24, 2007, when the 
Joint Forum of Gaonburahs (village headmen) and Doaibashis (village elders) or the 
JFGBDB issued an overall underground cease-fire, the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) 
representatives were present.
20
 Moreover, the visible involvement of the JFGBDB in 
the dialogue since 2007 makes it difficult for the NSCN (IM) to issue similar notices 
to the Naga peace facilitators as it did in 2001 due to the social stature of the 
JFGBDB. The legitimacy of the present Naga dialogue was acknowledged by the 
NSCN (IM) General Secretary, Muivah in his speech at Camp Hebron, the NSCN 
(IM) headquarters, in July 2007.
21
 
 
The UNLF in Manipur broke up into two factions, one led by Meghen and the 
other led by Namoijam Oikam---the UNLF (Oken group) in 1990 resulting in a 
                                                        
16
 Field Observations by the author in Nagaland, 2007.  
17
Vibhou Ganguly, ‗Peace and Reconciliation Convention Held in 
Nagaland‘:http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india-news/peace-and-reconciliation-convention-
held-in-nagaland_100163818.html (sighted 5 June 2009).  
18
Ibid. 
19Author‘s interview with Naga Peace Reconciliation Leaders, July 2007. Names not revealed 
due to protection of source.  
20
 ‗GBs and DBs Declare CFs Among Factions‘, Nagaland Post, 25 July 2007, 1. The author 
was also present in Dimapur on that day to observe the process.  
21
 Speech by Thuingaleng Muivah, 6
th
 Naga Peoples‘ Consultation Meeting, 27 July 2007, 
Camp Hebron, NSCN (IM) headquarters, Nagaland where the author was present as an 
observer.  
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bloody factional clash leaving more than 100 people dead.  The UNLF (both 
factions) have accelerated violent activities against the security forces with no 
ceasefire being envisioned in the near future. With regard to the DHD, the spate of 
violence in the North Cachar Hills could be viewed as a consequence of power-
battles with factional fights mainly aimed at dominating the authoritative allocation 
of resources and territory. Given the fact that both factions of the DHD: DHD (N) 
and DHD (J)are heavily dependent on the extortion networks run in common areas, 
violence is about dominating a particular territorial space. 
 
External Support: The Regional Level of Analysis 
 
Internal wars fought for local issues are hardly localized affairs. They involve a 
complex transnational network (Kaldor 2007: 2). Armed groups garner support from 
external sources especially with regard to the hardware of violence. External support 
is contingent on the geography of the area where the armed groups are active. 
Support from neighbouring areas could be political, moral, military, economic, 
territorial or cultural based on ethnic ties.  
 
The Northeastern states share a 4500 km highly porous border with China in the 
north, Myanmar in the East, Bangladesh in the southwest and Bhutan in the 
northwest whereas it precariously clings to the rest of India by a 22 km narrow strip 
of land in Bengal known as the ―Chicken‘s Neck‖. Both the ULFA and the NSCN 
(IM) have training camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Significantly, the unified 
NSCN was formed in Myanmar on January 31, 1980.
22
 In 1986, ULFA established 
linkages with the unified NSCN. Both the rebel groups have strong connections with 
the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in Myanmar (Tucker 2000:82-85).The 
Kachin National Army (KNA) took Rs. 100,000 per head to train ULFA cadres in 
the 1980s and 1990s in Myanmar. Southern Bhutan also offered a safe haven in the 
1980s and 1990s. However, on December 15, 2003, the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) 
and the Royal Body Guards (RBG) comprising 6000 military personnel forcefully 
expelled 3000 ULFA and KIO cadres from Bhutan and destroyed nearly 30 training 
camps. Many top ULFA functionaries were also arrested. These groups then shifted 
to Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
 
ULFA leaders like Arabinda Rajkhowa and Paresh Barua, Commander-in-Chief 
were able to function from Bangladesh until they were arrested in December 2009 
with the change of regime there in 2008. From 1995 onwards, India also conducted 
joint military operations along with the Myanmar‘s army known as the Tatmadaw. 
These operations have however not been very successful as underground camps 
continue to flourish along the porous 1, 463 kms India-Myanmar border.  
 
The NSCN (IM) takes the help of the Karen National Union (KNU) fighting the 
Myanmar junta since 1947. The outfit has also ventured into the Chinese black 
market in Yunnan province. Small arms are shipped through the Chittagong port in 
Bangladesh. It also had a procurement officer in Philippines, Anthony Shimray, who 
enjoyed deep connections with the South East Asian small arms network (Egratau 
2006: 78).  Also, in order to get a deeper sense of these external linkages, it is rather 
important to understand that the Nagas and the Meiteis had played a crucial role in 
the Burma Front (1942-42) against the Japanese assault during World War II. The 
joint training, and experiences in the Burma jungle and their successes in thwarting 
the Japanese, immensely influenced the Nagas, Mizos and the Meiteis.  
 
                                                        
22
 See ―Nagalim‖ at http://www.unpo.org/member_profile.php?id=41n  (sighted on 21.02.2007). 
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China began to aggressively support similar revolutionary movements across 
the world after the Communist takeover in 1949. Thereafter, it provided strong 
political, economic and logistical support to various armed groups in Northeast India 
motivated by the goal of countering Western imperialism, Soviet revisionism in Asia 
in return of which most of these groups supported the ―One China policy‖ with 
regard to Taiwan. The Nagas were greatly inspired by the Chinese ideas of ―Peoples‘ 
War‖ and ―protracted struggle‖. In 1966, Muivah, then member of NNC led a 130 
strong Naga guerrilla force in a three month trek to Yunnan province in China 
mostly helped by the Kachins. He later on moved onto Beijing to get political 
training thus becoming the first Naga to visit China followed by Isak Chisi Swu and 
Moure Angami in 1968. China‘s help to the Mizos is also well documented 
subsequently followed by help to outfits like the UNLF. ULFA was also in contact 
with China in the 1990s. However, Deng Xiaoping ―good neighbour policy‖ stopped 
Chinese aid to these outfits except for flow of illegal Chinese arms through the black 
market via Cox Bazar near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. 
 
 
STATE RESPONSE TO THE ARMED CONFLICTS  
 
The Indian state‘s response to armed ethnic conflicts in the Northeast can be located 
within three conceptual parameters. 
1. Limited and proportionate use of force. 
2. Use of dialogue and negotiations. 
3. Structural changes. 
 
Limited and Proportionate Use of Force 
  
If one analyses the response of the Indian state to armed ethnic conflicts starting with 
the Naga conflict in the 1950s, the ULFA in the 1970s, or the Mizo armed 
insurgency in the 1960s-1980s, proportionate use of force has been the key 
dominating factor of a responsive state. However, policies like ―grouping of 
villages‖ in the Mizo conflict did result in population displacement and death of non-
combatants. From 1967 to 1972, 80 per cent of the Mizo population numbering 
nearly 240,000 people were uprooted from their homes and placed in 102 new 
villages known as ‗protected and progressive villages‘(Nunthara 1981: 1237-40).The 
army contended that population control was important for counter-insurgency. 
However, the re-grouping resulted in forced displacement of people, destruction of 
centuries-old traditional homes, paddy and grain. It also created deep seated 
resentment against the Indian state. Therefore, the Mizo case teaches us that though 
grouping of villages worked effectively in isolating the armed group, it was not the 
most prudent policy to be followed and will not work in other areas of the Northeast. 
At best, the grouping strategy creates difficulties for the local population. At worst, it 
follows an earlier British colonial tactic of countering dissent from the locals against 
colonial practices. An India that itself fought colonialism must not be seen as 
replicating the colonisers‘ behaviour in its post-colonial phase of state-building. The 
Indian state has thereby learned from the Mizo experience and has ensured that the 
use of force in armed ethnic conflicts be guided by the notion of ‗proportionality‖.  
 
Before getting down to the issue of proportionality with regard to the use of 
force by India against armed groups in the Northeast, let us dwell on the intellectual 
roots of proportionality.  
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Intellectual Roots of Proportionate use of force 
 
The proportionate use of force enjoys a rich intellectual tradition known as Just War. 
In setting forth this tradition on war, the contributions of St. Augustine, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Vatel, Vittoria, Hugo Grotius, Paul Ramsey and Michael Walzer have been 
significant. 
 
St. Augustine is widely believed to be the founder of the intellectual tradition of 
Just War (Brunk 1996: 36). He was amongst the foremost Christian thinkers to 
formulate the concept of justum bellum systematically directing western Christian 
thought towards the problem of war (Holmes 1989: 15). Augustine questioned the 
Roman idea of morality as more vicious than others in its pursuance of the end that 
is morality especially after witnessing the sack of Rome in 410 A.D.  For Augustine, 
the ―heart of the matter of virtue or of justice consists in a matter of the heart‖ 
(Ramsey 1992: 10). The right inner intention or direction of the will is of prime 
significance. He explicitly covered the issue of right intention, which means 
legitimate goals. Augustine also emphasized on the need for a legitimate authority, 
allowing only those responsible for public order to declare war in his jus ad bellum. 
According to him, ‗just wars‘ were to be waged strictly for the restoration of peace 
and must be the last resort. It was to be undertaken, not to kill, but to prevent further 
loss of life. It was only in the twelfth century that Augustine‘s theory received 
publicity and acquired significance in warfare. This was mainly due to the writings 
of the Bolognian monk, Gratium, who wrote the classic Decretum. Drawing upon the 
Just War writings of Augustine, as well as other Roman and Greek scholars, Gratium 
added a significant aspect to the theory – that a Just War must avoid non-combatants. 
During this time, a lot of thinking went into the concept of ―double effect‖. Double 
effect means that in case of firing between two enemy platoons, if non-combatants 
got hit, it was largely unintentional and thus justified. In today‘s strategic 
vocabulary, such killings are termed as ―collateral damage.‖ The problem, as Walzer 
argues, is that this provides a ‗blanket – justification‘ for civilian deaths that are 
‗unintended‘ but foreseeable (Walzer 1992: 153).Going further from Gratium, St. 
Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica developed and strengthened some of the 
various sub-divisions of jus ad bellum, most notably legitimate authority, just cause 
and right and moral intention. He stressed that competent authority must not wage 
war out of their own thirst for political hegemony, but only to avenge evil done to 
them (Teson 1988: 43). 
 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) were 
instrumental in the development of a secular Just War doctrine. Both pointed out that 
armed intervention to assist people suffering under an unjust sovereign was just, but 
the tension between order and justice remained. In On the Law of War and Peace, 
Grotius cited three causes that are just: to defend against an injury, to recover what is 
legally due, and to inflict punishment on a wrong doing state for excessive crimes. In 
other words, Grotius cited punishment of excessive crimes (punitio) on its citizens 
by a state as a just cause for war (Grotius: 44). 
 
The reconsideration of the Just War theory in contemporary times has much to 
do with the writings of Paul Ramsey, and Michael Walzer. Walzer through his 
seminal work Just and Unjust Wars has been the driving force in restating the theory 
in the present context. Paul Ramsey‘s War and Christian Conscience has a profound 
impact on Just War thinking. He drew inspiration for his work from the New 
Testament, St. Augustine, Immanuel Kant and Reinhold Neibuhr. Augustine‘s 
understanding of agape (love thy neighbour) influenced Ramsey‘s principles. 
According to Ramsey, agape established a set of principles which all Christians 
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should follow. Use of force to protect oneself denies neighbourly love (Sermon on 
the Mount). The aggressor must never be denied the love Christ taught. The enemy, 
however, wicked or deceitful remains one‘s neighbour. Ramsey uses this reason in 
his philosophy for the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality. 
Ramsey also made an explicit connection between the idea of non-combatant 
immunity and the requirements of Christian love for neighbour. This turned out to be 
a powerful argument in connection to religious ethical reflection during the 1950s 
and 1960s.  Ramsey was against intentional attack on non-combatants. The jus in 
bello’s criteria states that discrimination must be given a prior normative position 
over all other principles of the theory. If it cannot be met, no amount of reasoning for 
proportionality can supplement it. Michael Walzer contends that jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello principles of the Just War Theory are crucial in both the recourse to war 
and the conduct of war. Just wars are limited wars and their conduct is governed by a 
set of rules designed to restrict behaviour (Walzer 2002)
.
 He argues that it is easier 
now than ever before, to imagine a General saying ―no, we can‘t do that; it would 
cause too many civilian deaths; we have to find another way‖ (Walzer 2002). Walzer 
advocates the necessity of turning the non-combatant immunity principle into a 
stronger rule, until it is something of an absolute dictum.
23
 
 
While there are several principles of the Just War theory, for the purposes of 
this study, the jus in bello (right conduct in war) principles are extremely important. 
These are the following: 
 
1) Proportionality of Means 
Means used in war must not outdo or overweigh the good achieved. This calls for 
proportionality between the probable course of action and the end that it serves. 
Michael Walzer does not agree that mathematical calculation of proportionality is 
possible, for values at stake are not commensurate – as the idea of proportion may 
suggest. How can one measure the value of a country‘s independence against the 
value of lives lost in defending it? (Walzer 1992: xv-vi). It is neither feasible nor 
morally correct to put in mathematical terms the number of lives that should be lost 
in acquiring freedom or self-determination for a community.  
 
2) Discrimination/Non-combatant Immunity 
The laws of war affirm that civilians or non-combatants should never be targeted in 
war. Certain categories of the population are classified as non-combatants: the very 
young, the very old, infirm and all those who lack capacity to engage in war or to 
contribute to the running of machinery of war. Direct targeting of civilians as well as 
civilian infrastructure is not supported by jus in bello.  
 
According to D.P Lackey,  
 
there is an objective and a subjective version of the principle of non-combatant immunity. 
The objective version holds that if civilians are killed as a result of military operations, the 
principle is violated. The subjective version holds that if civilians are intentionally killed as a 
result of military operations, the principle is violated. It follows on the subjective versions 
that if civilians are killed in the course of a military operation directed at a military target, the 
principle of discrimination has not been violated. (Lackey 1989: 60). 
 
This criterion also prohibits targeting of economic infrastructure, 
communication and transportation systems, electric power grids and water pumping 
systems. If such infrastructures are targeted, the costs to human lives (spread of 
disease in epidemic levels) are disproportionate to the threat posed. 
                                                        
23
 A Conversation with Michael Walzer, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New 
Delhi, 23 December 2002. 
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Since the ULFA and the NSCN (IM) project a certain degree of civil society 
support, the disproportionate use of force by the Indian state can be counter-
productive. The Kakopathar incident of February 5, 2006 in Tinsukia district of 
Assam is telling in this regard. Ajit Mahanta, a civilian, picked up by the army on 
suspicion of linkages to the ULFA was found dead after a few days in army custody. 
On February 10, 2006, people from nearly 100 villages protested Mahanta‘s death. 
The police opened fire on the protesters killing eight people. Police sources stated 
that the protestors had got unruly.
24
 In reaction, S. Kaliban, the Inspector General 
(intelligence), Assam pointed out that the army and police should have observed 
restraint as laid down by the Unified Command Structure. Consequently, ULFA 
reaped enormous benefits from the Kakopathar killings. Its military head, Paresh 
Barua stated that ―we have called for the strike to protest against inhuman crimes 
committed by Indian forces such as killing innocent people in its custody and firing 
on unarmed protesters.‖25 
 
 Policymakers and elite advisors at the Central level perhaps range themselves 
from political compromise and accommodation to ―repressive coercion‖ and ―co-
option‖. Along with this state policy, armed insurrection of this nature is fed by 
antagonistic feelers like exclusivist histories, ethnic homelands, and demonizing the 
―other‖ propaganda. The state is also responsible for limiting democratic space in the 
Northeast with draconian laws like the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, 
amended in 1972, which gives enormous powers to the security personnel: arrest 
without warrant, search on limited proof of suspicious activities, and immunity from 
judicial review of personnel behaviour.
26
 While armed groups like the UNLF 
frequently target innocent people without cause, the state‘s disproportionate use of 
force is more criticized than that of the armed groups given the fact that it can be 
held accountable to the ‗rule of law‘.  
 
It is asserted by many security analysts that the ULFA, UNLF, DHD and the 
NSCN (IM) pretend to espouse people‘s causes. Politics of the people interspersed 
by historical sub-national narratives, demanding acceptance of unique identity and 
culture, are used by armed groups to justify their violent tactics of engagement 
(Baruah 2005: 99-106). Such arguments by security analysts are valid and worth 
engaging upon, but they fail to capture a distinct reality. These armed groups are 
rooted in local civil societies. Young cadres might be misguided, impoverished and 
illiterate, yet are deeply aware of the rebel outfits‘ version of political and social 
history. These youths believe that the present conditions of poverty and tribal 
melancholy can be redressed by an independent status. The Indian state‘s failure to 
directly deal with these radical ideologies has only aggravated the situation (Mahanta 
2008: 95-107). 
 
With regard to the use of force, the Indian Army, like most other conventional 
armies in the world, treats counter-insurgency as secondary to its primary duty of 
defending India from external threats.  Consequently, little serious thought has been 
given to doctrinal innovations within the Army with regard to insurgent 
contingencies. Earlier organizational innovations like the Insurgency (I) Battalions 
and the present paramilitary force, the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) was/is mostly of a light 
infantry variety composed of deputed army personnel trained within the rigour of the 
                                                        
24Anand Kumar, ―Assam: Kokopathar Killings Gives Strength to Dying ULFA‖, at 
http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1733.html  (sighted on 5 February 2007). 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 For more on the AFSPA, see ―The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958‖ 
http://www.mha.nic.in/acts-rules/armed_forces_special_powers_act1958.pdf (sighted on 4.04.2008).  
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conventional regimental ethos (Rosen 1996: 212-248). Hence, these units were/are 
ill equipped to deal with insurgents whose strategy is aimed at protracted war by 
small guerrilla bands.  
 
Organizationally, India has established extensive paramilitary forces under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Home Affairs like the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), 
the Border Security Force (BSF), the Assam Rifles (AR), etc, but it has been 
increasingly felt that these units are neither capable nor trained enough to counter 
highly motivated armed groups sprung from a local population base. Mostly 
equipped with classic police functions like ―riot control‖ and ―cordon searches, the 
BSF, the CRPF, and the AR has failed to handle the complexity of ethnic conflicts in 
a consequentially effective manner (Rajagopalan 2004: 25-37). More often than not, 
counter-insurgency operations are based on an informal ―community of military 
knowledge‖ drawn upon experiences of personnel stationed in insurgency zones and 
not on a formally codified body of knowledge attuned for unconventional warfare.  
Consequently, such unconventional military action is open to various interpretations. 
At best, one could argue that such informality could perhaps result in adaptability 
and flexibility in the mission area. At worst, it might result in fuzzy understanding of 
the conflict zone, the strategic context and the political issues at stake. There is also a 
discernible lack of self criticality within army circles to acknowledge counter-
insurgency failures and learn from past mistakes. Sadly enough, the army continues 
to follow a strategy of attrition---whose principal goal is the number of insurgents 
killed vis-à-vis army fatalities (Goswami 2009: 66-86). Ironically, amidst this 
strategy of attrition, a strategy of ―winning hearts and minds‖ of the local population 
is supposedly followed by the army despite a contextual situation of high distrust 
between the army personnel and the affected population (Komer 1972: 1-17).
27
 The 
end result is, therefore, sub-optimal. Also, the winning ―hearts and minds‖ strategy 
fails to garner support of the local population since it is mostly viewed as espousing 
certain vested state interests.
28
 
 
It serves the purpose of democracies best when the military measures are 
limited. In this context, Assam has witnessed the gradual change in its overall 
counter-insurgency strategy due to the measured military responses by the army after 
the 1990s. The ULFA has tried to provoke the military to respond disproportionately 
by targeting non-combatants since 2000 onwards but the restraint shown by state 
forces has led to a public outcry against ULFA‘s violence discrediting the group to a 
large extent.
29
 Similarly, the increasing violence in Naga areas in recent months 
between factions, 
30
 and the security forces‘ measured response have build a certain 
level of trust between the army and the local people in Nagaland. The populations of 
Diphupar and Chumukidima villages in Nagaland were of the firm view that their 
safe passage through the state highways as also protection of agricultural fields from 
insurgent actors by the army has been a respite. Otherwise insurgent actors would 
routinely stop public transport and demand exorbitant taxes from passengers, non-
payment of which results in either grave physical injury or death. This local attitude 
towards the army is a far cry from the 1960s and 1970s when it was feared by the 
local people and routinely accused of human rights violations.
31
 
 
                                                        
27
 See ―Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations‖, Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry 
of Defence (Army), Headquarters Army Training Command, December 2006.  
28
Ibid.  
29
 Field Visit to Assam in July 2007 and interviews with local media, people and villagers.  
30
 See ―Wanyuh, others condemn factional clash‖, Nagaland Post, May 7, 2008 at 
http://www.nagalandpost.com/Statedesc.asp?sectionid=59518 (sighted on 7 May 2008).  
31
Interview with Naga Hoho, Apex Naga tribal body, Diphupar, Nagaland, July 2007. 
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Critique and a Recommendation 
 
The case of Malaya and Punjab amply demonstrate the necessity of a well trained, 
highly motivated and localized state police force to counter-insurgency. This is not 
happening in Assam, Nagaland or Manipur where the state police forces are in 
disarray due to absence of reforms. Police infrastructure in the North East also lacks 
focused attention compromising the force‘s ability to counter insurgencies (Marwah 
1996: 224-230). The North East Police Academy established in 1978 remains largely 
ineffective due to lack of funds (Latimer 2004: 53).
32
 Interestingly, the 2007-2008 
Ministry of Home Affairs Report on Internal Security has pledged 100 per cent funds 
for police modernization in the region.
33
 Hopefully these recommendations will be 
implemented in letter and spirit. It is rather important that the local police are given 
the task of fighting insurgents rather than the army. The advantages enjoyed by local 
police in this regard are manifold: they belong to the area of operations and are 
permanently posted there. Consequently, their intelligence gathering and assessment 
skills are more developed. This ―special police‖ capability in countering insurgents 
was vividly visible in the Malayan experience where the army, at best, played a 
supportive role. 
 
Some argue that the RR is the Indian army‘s answer to counter-insurgency. To 
my mind, the RR is primarily an organizational innovation without doctrinal support 
suited to counter-insurgency. Originally conceptualized by former Chief of Army 
Staff, General B. C. Joshi, the RR was mostly established to provide rear area 
security in Punjab during Operation Brasstacks against Pakistan in 1987. It was later 
made into a counter-insurgency force when Jammu and Kashmir erupted with 
insurgent violence in 1989. However, the RR is handicapped as it is not manned by 
personnel with a separate doctrinal training outside the army; indeed, the personnel 
belonging to different infantry regiments in the army are posted on RR duty on a 
rotational two year basis. This limits their ability, unlike the police, to create a well-
honed culture for counter-insurgency operations based on a continuous field 
experience. Neither are they capable of acquiring cultural knowledge of an area in 
such a short posting. According to Rajesh Rajagopalan ―the RR is like any other 
regular army infantry battalion in the way it operates‖ (Rajagopalan 2004: 35).  This 
lack of doctrinal changes has limited the military‘s ability to work out complex 
issues of insurgencies in a context specific manner. Most counter-insurgency 
operations are manned by massive force concentration ill-suited to counter a small 
band of insurgents. In Assam, Operation Bajrang and Operation Rhino were 
intensive military operations against the ULFA, which included other paramilitary 
forces as well like the AR, the CRPF, etc., mostly trained in conventional warfare, 
riot control, and cordon searches. The operations‘ size was a massive 30, 000 to 40, 
000 men in order to fight an armed ULFA guerrilla force of a 1000 men and women! 
Tactically, of course, these operations were successful as they flushed out the ULFA 
headquarters at Lakhipathar, Assam and also succeeded in arresting many ULFA 
cadres. Strategically, however, these operations were disastrous. Not only did the 
massive deployment of troops alienate the local people but also most ULFA leaders 
and cadres were able to flee to neighbouring Bhutan. The plethora of forces also 
created immense confusion with regard to efficient coordination. Realizing the 
problem of coordination, the Central Government has now set up the Unified 
Command Structure under the IV Corp in Assam.  This step, which upgrades the 
army to operational dominance over the local police, is however, seen as hostile to 
                                                        
32
North East Police Academy, North East Training Academy Background Information at 
http://nepa.nic.in/main.html (sighted on 12 August  2007) 
33
 See Status Paper on Internal Security Situation, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Government of India (March 31, 2007) : 23.  
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local democratic procedures (Marwah 1996: 224-230). Indeed, I argue that this is a 
flawed approach. What is actually needed is a ―special police‖ branch based on small 
agile forces comprised of personnel trained in guerrilla tactics and adept at mountain 
warfare, who will patrol thickly forested areas even at night. Equipped with adequate 
terrain knowledge and enjoying permanency of tenure in the insurgency affected 
area, these special police forces stand a better chance in activating ―trust and 
nurture‖ (Goswami 2009: 66-86) 
 
Counter-insurgency is a difficult task; the personnel involved in such duties is 
required to project a combination of a policeman, a guerrilla fighter, an intelligence 
officer, a peace negotiator and a giver of humanitarian aid. It also requires high 
initiative, visible motivation, passion for the job, local trust building and nurturing, 
terrain awareness, permanency of tenure, effective intelligence (Gompert 2007), 
creative leadership, and political awareness. Most importantly, special counter-
insurgency units must be adept at both intelligence gathering and population 
reassurance. Guaranteeing the local population of their security is a must for building 
a trust relationship but it also includes development of infrastructure and continuous 
dedicated maintenance of these projects (nurture). The 57 Mountain Field Artillery 
Brigade stationed in Haflong, Assam, despite its reluctance to shoulder counter-
insurgency duty, is doing a good job to safeguard villages from insurgent activity by 
operating out of garrison and in the night. The reassured village communities are 
grateful for the security brought into their otherwise high risk existence through 
these efforts.
34
 However, since this particular division will be stationed in the area 
for not more than two years, it is necessary to instill the local police with such 
practices coupled with better pay and incentives. At present, the salaries received by 
police personnel in Assam is so miniscule than he is forced at times to join the 
insurgent extortion nexus to keep his family off a ―hand to mouth‖ existence.35 
 
In Nagaland, the local villages have undertaken counter-insurgency measures by 
forming their own small groups of armed young men for security against insurgent 
raids especially at night.
36
 Though not completely successful, these measures have 
brought in some succour for the local people from factional fighting between the 
NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K) and the NSCN (U). Also, the Army has been seen with 
guarded hope given the fact that it has engaged in local development activities like 
building schools, providing medical facilities in remote villages and also enabling 
transportation. The idea of small defence village units could be taken ahead and be 
converted into special police units adept in local culture, dialect, as well as urban and 
jungle warfare.  
 
Use of Dialogue and Negotiations 
 
The word ‗dialogue‘ is a combination of the Greek words dia meaning ‗through‘ or 
‗across‘ and logos meaning ‗word‘ or ‗reason‘. Dialogue therefore implies ‗a sense 
of creating meaning through talking or reasoning together‘ (Broome and Hatay 2006: 
630). Dialogue deals with the challenge of understanding complexities at the social, 
political and cultural levels buttressed by differences in perceptions of the contextual 
situation, vagueness regarding causes of conflict, and ambiguity with regard to the 
future. Hence, the notion of dialogue, operating within the framework created by 
such antecedent conditions, is to squarely meet the challenge of coordinating 
meaning through participatory processes by bringing together diverse groups of 
                                                        
34
 Author‘s interviews with village communities in Mpuielo, Jatinga and Sonpijang villages, 
North Cachar Hills, Assam, July 17-21, 2007. 
35
 Author‘s interviews with Haflong police personnel, Haflong, Assam, July 19, 2007.  
36
 Author  Interview with local villages, Dhansiripar, Nagaland, July 2007. 
Namrata Goswami 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  6 0 ,  M a r c h  2 0 1 1                                                    18 
actors with differences in personal experiences, perceptions and, at times, a history 
of violent conflict between them. The aim of most dialogical conflict resolution 
mechanisms is to create conditions for coordinated action towards a common goal: 
the end of violence and the emergence of an inclusive and peaceful society.  
 
According to Hal Sanders, of the International Institute for Sustained Dialogue 
and the Kettering Foundation, 
 
dialogue is a process of genuine interaction through which human beings listen to each other 
deeply enough to be changed by what they learn. Each makes a serious effort to take others‘ 
concern into her or his own picture, even when disagreement persists. No participant gives up 
her or his identity, but each recognizes enough of the other‘s valid human claims that he or 
she will act differently toward the other. (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 20-21) 
 
If one assesses the Indian response to the armed conflicts in the Northeast, 
dialogue and negotiations have always been an option. In the case of the Naga 
conflict, the dialogue started as early as 1947 with the Akbar Hydari agreement, the 
Naga Peace Mission of 1964, the civil society interactions, the Shillong Accord of 
1975 and now the ongoing peace negotiations with the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN 
(K). The Mizo armed conflict also witnessed negotiations from a very early period. 
The Mizo National Front‗s shift in interests towards a more power-sharing 
mechanism within India was met by the Union government with the grant of Union 
Territory status in 1972. Consequently, the Union government held out the promise 
of full statehood, which met the political interests of most Mizos short of 
independence. In this regard, then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi‘s role in signing 
peace agreements with protest movements and insurgent groups in North East India 
like the Assam Accord of 1985 and the subsequent Mizo Accord of 1986 was 
significant. This empathy shown by the Union government to the political demands 
of the Mizos worked in its favour towards resolving the issue. The Mizoram case of 
indigenous mediators is also classic in this context. The Mizo Church, led by 
Revered Zairema, took on a leading role in mediation as early as 1968. 
Subsequently, a peace mission comprising of the Presbyterian and Baptist Church 
was formed to persuade the MNF to give up violence. Chief Minister Chhunga along 
with the Young Mizo Association (YMA), the MizoZirlai Pawl (MZP), and the 
Human Rights Committee of Brigadier T. Sailo, who later became chief minister, 
formed the Mizo Peace Advisory Committee on November 12, 1974, to pressurise 
both the MNF and the security forces to resist violent means (Verghese and 
Thanzawna 1997) Counterfactually, without these strong mediations from the local 
society, the MNF might not have been amenable to a political settlement (Goswami 
2009: 579-89) 
 
Coming to the ULFA, the latest developments with regard to release of ULFA 
leaders indicate that the Union government on its part, with active facilitation by the 
Assam state government, is open to ―unconditional talks‖ with the ULFA. Hence, 
jailed ULFA leaders are being released in a phased manner perhaps to ensure that its 
commitment to talks is sealed. This is buttressed by the fact that on December 7, 
2010, ULFA founding member and ideologue, Bhimakanta Burhagohain was 
released from jail following the November 27 release of ULFA Deputy Commander-
in-Chief, Raju Baruah and Culture Secretary Pranati Deka. These three releases were 
contingent upon developments on the ―talks‖ front. In fact, to add credibility to the 
Government‘s desire for talks with the jailed ULFA leadership, founding member 
and Vice Chairman of ULFA, Pradip Gogoi had been released on March 7, 2010 
itself.  On December 31, 2010, ULFA Chairperson, Arabinda Rajkhowa was 
released.  
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While one could argue that there is not much hope for long lasting peace to 
settle in Assam given that ULFA leaders are forced to talk to the Union government 
under duress, it is important to note that this is not the first time the framework of 
talks have been utilized by the Government of India as a conflict resolution 
mechanism with the ULFA. In September 2005, efforts had been made to reach out 
to the ULFA with the formation of the People's Consultative Group (PCG). (The 
PCG was the 11 member civilian group formed by the ULFA to talk to the Centre on 
its behalf). At that time, the process failed as ULFA lacked commitment to the talks 
and instead increased its armed cadres during that period.   
 
This time around, it is critical that the talks succeed and ULFA‘s commitment 
to the peace process is sincere. For that to bear fruit, it is vital that the framework of 
the talks be informed by the element of inclusiveness based on a ‗problem solving‘ 
approach. A number of stakeholders in the conflict including local civil society 
actors from ULFA strongholds like Sibsagar, Tinsukia and Dibrugarh with divergent 
or common interests and perceptions should come together to work out a map for 
prevention, management and resolution of the conflict. This will also ensure that the 
talks enjoy solid societal support and limit the ability of ―peace spoilers‖ to sabotage 
the peace process. Also, the dialogue process must not be hijacked by a powerful 
actor (for instance, the state) who could perhaps utilize it to buy time to forward its 
own agenda. Instead, there must be joint ownership of the process in order to address 
problems and issues which have brought about this division.  
 
Dealing with the fear of domination within the dialogue framework 
 
The fear of being dominated by the northern Indian heartland is a perennial feature 
in Assamese Manipuri, Dimasa and Naga political, cultural, and social discourses. 
These groups express hurt at a perceived northern treatment of them as inferior 
people.
37
 They dislike being termed exotic, mysterious and unknown. Having 
witnessed a modern war (World War II) in their soil and high levels of migrations 
from South and South East Asia, they see no justification for such arguments. The 
armed groups provide platforms for articulation of such concerns. The fear element 
also has a more lethal connotation. Fear is also used as a tool of population control 
and intimidation by these armed groups. Many mainstream journalists argue that 
local Assamese people are fearful of ULFA.
38
 At least 10,000 people, mostly 
civilians, have died since ULFA‘s inception in 1979. These tactics of terror have 
killed the support base of the ULFA to a large extent. Prominent Assamese public 
figures like Homen Borgohain, Dr HirenGohain, Dr Amalendu Guha, Kanak Sen 
Deka, Chandra Prasad Saikia, Jayanta Madhab, Dr Nagen Saikia etc have 
condemned ULFA‘s indiscriminate violence. The NSCN (IM) is also ruthless in its 
use of violence. On May 19, 2006, the NSCN (K) ‗Education Kilonser‘ (Minister), 
NgampanKonyak was killed by the NSCN (IM) faction.
39
 Tribal passions run deep 
in the cadre base and create inter-tribal conflict. The DHD and UNLF also target 
―others‖ and passions run high resulting in extreme violence. The October 2005 
violent confrontation between the DHD and the UPDS in the hill districts of Assam 
is a case in point.  
 
                                                        
37
 Interviews conducted with Assamese and Naga students in Delhi, 2003-2006. 
38PrafulBidwai, ―ULFA: Assam‘s Irrational Syndrome‖, Sunday Times of India, New Delhi, 
December 23, 1990. 
39
 See ―Nagaland Assessment-Year‖ 2006, at 
http//www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/index.html (accessed on 
November 18, 2006).  
39
 http://www.nagalim.nl/news/archive-072006.html   (sighted on November 18, 2006) 
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To deal with these fears, certain structural response has been undertaken by the 
state. 
 
Structural Changes 
 
The most important structural response is the grant of greater political autonomy and 
statehood. In fact, as early as 1947, the Interim Government appointed a sub-
committee to the Constituent Assembly, the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and 
Excluded Areas Committee under the Chairmanship of then Assam Chief Minister, 
Gopinath Bardoloi. The committee recommended setting up of autonomous district 
councils to provide due representative structures at the local level to the tribal 
population. The recommendation was later incorporated into article 244 (2) of the 
Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Nagaland has been accorded special status 
under Constitutional law. Article 371 (A) states that no Act of Parliament in respect 
of religious or social practises of the Nagas, Naga customary law and procedure, 
administration of civil and criminal justice and ownership and transfer of land and 
resources will apply to Nagaland unless passed by the State Assembly. Statehood 
was also granted to Nagaland in 1963 followed by the North Eastern Areas (Re-
Organization) Act of 1971 which granted statehood to Manipur, Meghalaya and 
Tripura and granted Union Territory status to Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. In 
1986, the Mizo armed conflict was also resolved by granting statehood to Mizoram 
through the Mizo Accord of 1986.  
 
Another structural change that is being envisioned is through the ‗Look East‘ 
policy wherein it is envisioned that economic development and ‗opening up‘ trade 
routes to South East Asia via land and sea will bring about prosperity to the North-
Eastern states.  
 
Despite these significant state responses, three of the Northeastern states, 
namely Assam, Manipur and Nagaland continue to be affected by ethnic violence. In 
light of that, a few policy recommendations are in order. 
 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Since most of the armed groups are geared towards ethnic dominance, it is 
rather pertinent to manage ethnic dominance of one group by another. This can be 
realistically addressed by institution building at the local level giving representation 
to most groups (Hartzell 2006: 31-52). 
 
2. Societies support the armed groups due to lack of economic opportunities. 
Interviews with armed cadres by the author reveal this aspect starkly. Thereby, the 
state needs to activate a Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) 
programme to train, and provide alternate avenues for young misguided youths in 
these areas  (Dzinesa 2007: 73-89). Also, infrastructure building must be done in 
remote areas buttressed by vigilant oversight mechanisms to deter corrupt practices. 
 
3. The Indian constitution already possesses significant provisions to protect 
minority rights Articles like 371 (A) with regard to Nagaland and reservation of seats 
in the State Legislative Assemblies for Scheduled Tribes in the Northeast guarantee 
power sharing. Yet, the ―rule of law‖ is abysmal in these areas resulting in security 
dilemmas and armed violence. Subsequently, the law enforcement mechanisms need 
an urgent overhaul. 
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4. Many conflict analysts argue that internal armed conflicts are driven more 
by greed than grievance. Leading this school is Paul Collier who argues that 
economic agendas are the causes of conflict (Collier 2006: 1-29). This inference is 
based on a statistical data set which indicates that ―need deprivation‖ do not co-relate 
to the incidence of armed violence as much as indicators for economic incentives. 
The indicators for the economic agenda are: easily available assets like diamonds, 
drugs, extortions, etc., and this is linked to the proportion of young men in society 
aged between 15-24 years. This is based on the co-relation that rebellions are run by 
young unemployed men. However, Edward Azar‘s insightful analysis refute the 
―only greed‖ theory and indicate grievances like ethnicity, identity, needs-
deprivation etc informing conflicts. Interestingly, the recommendations that flow 
from both these two schools are similar as well as Collier‘s own admission in his 
section on policy recommendations that grievances could be a contributing factor. 
This paper argues that both greed and grievance play an equal role in creating armed 
conflicts and thereby, policy makers need to take cognizance of both while 
generating policy responses.  
 
5. Cross-border linkages are a crucial aspect of all the four cases of armed 
violence identified here. Hence, instead of ―looking east‖ since 1992, India needs to 
―act east‖ by carefully working out actionable frameworks of cooperation between 
itself and its neighbours based on sound groundwork on the nature of its 
neighbouring regimes. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has outlined a research framework for understanding armed ethnic 
movements in Northeast India as well as drawn attention to the Indian state‘s 
response to armed violence in the Northeast. The four cases of armed ethnic conflicts 
in the Northeast generated similar findings on armed ethnic conflicts in general. Five 
of the findings are very significant for larger theoretical studies on ethnic conflicts: 
 
First, individual motivations, security needs, identity issues, social status and 
means of livelihood are the prime reasons for the sustenance of armed ethnic 
conflicts across time and space. 
 
Second, armed ethnic conflicts do not have a specific timeframe; they are 
protracted in nature. 
 
Third, historical narratives on being different or feeling of alienation from a 
dominant ‗other‘ fuels armed ethnic conflicts.  
 
Fourth, armed ethnic conflicts in a state are sustained over time by external 
connections.  
 
Fifth, proportionate use of force and dialogical conflict resolution mechanism is 
perhaps the best response to armed ethnic conflicts especially in a democracy. 
 
A final concluding thought is in order here. Besides viewing armed ethnic 
conflicts through the level of analyses prism, it is equally important to do substantive 
study on conflict resolution mechanisms based on the policy recommendations 
offered above. Conflict resolution by definition indicates a comprehensive 
framework, going much beyond conflict management, which addresses the deep 
sources and root causes of any particular conflict. The Mizo peace process (1968-
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1986) in India indicates that the conflict was transformed from violent assertion to 
peaceful resolution as the root causes of the conflict were addressed, attitudes of the 
conflicting actors changed, and issues got reframed. Perhaps, taking clue from this 
successful case of conflict resolution as well as other successful examples from 
across the world, policy makers could better address the multiple armed ethnic 
conflicts plaguing the Northeastern landscape. 
Namrata Goswami 
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